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At the beginning of a decade it is tempting to look ahead for the next ten years.
In addition to end-of-decade targets, there is considerable interest, at the
present time, in end-of-century targets. Analysis of multi-decade developments
depends on an even longer view, and I shall focus my attention on the medium-
term outlook for one decade as much as possible.
This analysis will proceed through the medium of two econometric models,
one for the United States and one for the World as a whole. I shall refer to
available simulations of the Wharton Model of the United States for a single
(large) country appraisal. The U.S. weight in the total for all OECD countries
is more than one-third of aggregate production. Any sizeable action by the U.S.
is, therefore, reflected in the totals.
Other countries are going in their own chosen directions, and it will be useful
to try pull them all together in world model simulations from the equation
system of project LINK. The LINK system is an amalgamation of econometric
models from 17 OECD industrial countries, eight socialist countries, and four
regional models of developing countries.1
BASE CASE - UNITED STATES
First, let us consider a baseline simulation for the United States. There is
general recognition that something large (a “sea change”) has come over the
leading countries in the OECD area. In the case of the United States, real GNP
growth, from the end of World War II until the end of the 1960’s, averaged just
under 4%. The baseline projection shows a distinct tendency for the economy
to hover in the neighborhood of 3% growth. Slower growth, more inflation,
high interest costs, an elevated rate of unemployment and balance-of-payments
problems are manifest in the long sequence of tables generated by the Wharton
Annual Model. Some annual growth rates, recorded at live year intervals, are
listed in Table 1.
1 This is the present country/regional make-up of the LINK system. In some versions of system
simulations - set up a year or so ago - there are four fewer OECD country models and one fewer
centrally planned model.422 Economic Sciences 1980
This is a pattern familiar not only in the United States but in other industrial
countries. The changed economic profile between the post World War II
recovery/expansion period (1945-1970) and the period  since 1970, through
the end of the decade, is a result of some profound changes in the underlying
economic environment. They are related to such major events as
(i) energy supply-demand imbalance and a shift from inexpensive to dear
prices;
(ii) pressure on available food supplies and a shift towards higher food
prices;
(iii) accelerated inflation;
(iv) declining productivity growth;
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1 Forecast values: Wharton EFA. Real values in prices of 1972
(vi)
(v)   rapid expansion of the labor force;
increasing attention paid to problems of quality of life.
These issues started to appear in the late 1960’s, many in the wake of the
Vietnam war, and prevailed during the 1970’s which proved to be a turbulent
decade for the U. S. economy. Averages for the past decade, after smoothing of
cyclical movements show changed trends in growth, inflation, unemployment
rates, interest rates, internal deficits, and external deficits. It is also a period in
which the U. S. economy became highly internationalized; i. e., increasingly
subject to pressures of international events, less self-contained, and not at all
insulated. The differences between the 1970’s and earlier decades are matters of
recorded history. The average trends estimated from the decade 1971-1980L. R. Klein  423
govern the projections for the 1980’s and 1990’s. There is no indication that the
trends of the 1970’s were aberrations and that we are likely to return to the
heady days of earlier postwar decades. The reasons for this changed perfor-
mance are contained in the six points listed above, but in this essay, I want to
look at the problem through the medium of econometric model simulation,
rather than point-by-point analysis of the six items.2
Table 2. Selected U. S. Economic Indicators Projections to 1990.
A trend projection of a large scale econometric model has a special interpre-
tation. In the initial two or three years of such an extrapolation, an attempt is
made to introduce as much specific business-cycle content as possible by
moving principal policy magnitudes along specified short-run courses that
interpret budget commitments, tax statutes, behavior of monetary authorities,
and various economic regulations. This portion of the extrapolation may
properly be labelled as a multi-dimensional forecast. From that point forward,
major inputs are placed on recent medium-term trend paths. A set of exoge-
2 The Wharton Model projections for the United States, reported here, were prepared by Vijaya
Duggal, Gene Guill, George Schink, and Yacov Sheinin.424 Economic Sciences 1980
nous inputs are sought, by trial and error, that generate a balanced growth
path for the economy. By balanced growth, I refer to several established long
run characteristics that are used to constrain the solution. These are:
(a) equality between the real growth rate and real interest rate;
(b) a stable savings ratio;
(c) a stable wage share of GNP;
(d) a stable velocity ratio;
(e) tolerable deficits, internal and external.
It is not easy, but it is generally possible, to find a set of input values which,
together with initial conditions, generate a model solution with these proper-
ties. There is no guarantee that such a solution, determined from a model of
some 1000 or more interrelated equations, is unique, but there is no indication
that a very different one exists that also meets these enumerated conditions.
It was evident at the beginning of the 1970’s - as early as 1970, in fact -
that if we were to try to bring projected solutions of the Wharton Model closer
to established long run trends for growth and unemployment that internal
pressures would be built up that would unbalance the solution for the economy.
Inflation would pick up, the domestic deficit would grow abnormally large, and
the net foreign balance would move into serious deficit. It did not seem possible
to start from prevailing initial conditions and end up with a solution to the
model that moved on a higher growth path, conforming to history and satisfy-
ing the constraints imposed on the long run extrapolation. Generally speaking,
the model would produce higher rates of inflation and large domestic and
foreign deficits. Further development of feedbacks to capital flows and dollar
exchange rates were not explicitly developed.
The trial and error simulation procedure gives the following indications:
(i) the long term growth rate has fallen by about one percentage point;
(ii) the inflation rate has been raised by about five percentage points;
(iii) the current account balance is barely maintained;
(iv) productivity growth is resumed, but at a rate lower by about one
percentage point;
(v) nominal interest rates are generally higher than in the past;
(vi) domestic fiscal balance is eventually attained.
At the very beginning of a new economic situation, determined to a great
extent by adverse external circumstances, we should expect to find an immedi-
ate decline in the growth rate, but should the production path of the economy
be shifted downwards, once and for all by a level amount, and then revert to the
former growth rate, or should the growth rate itself, be lowered? Equilibrium
growth theory and intuition suggest that after the initial growth decline the
economy should return to the old growth rate. The level of production should
be shifted downwards, but the rate of expansion should recover to the old
position. Large scale econometric models do not seem to produce that result, at
least over the period of one decade. There appears to be a downshift of the
entire growth rate; thus, the United States are now expected to grow at about
3% instead of 4%, and that is a familiar pair of numbers often cited to describe
expectations in a number of individual countries of Western Europe. ForL. R. Klein  425
Japan, the downshift in long term equlibrium growth is from about 10 percent
to 5 %. This is an interesting finding that pervades many econometric model-
ing exercises for different countries and, as we shall see, for the world, too.
If the economy of the United States is stimulated toward recovery of the
higher growth path of the 1950’s and 1960’s, a gap in trade and payments
appears. But if the economy is allowed to proceed along the more moderate
path of 3%, the current account stays close to balance with only slight
deterioration in spite of a continuing increase (assumed) in the real price of
imported oil. There is some tendency towards energy conservation, but the
value of oil imports is expected to grow significantly, year by year. Mainstays of
the American current balance are growing agricultural exports and an impres-
sive positive balance for services, or invisible accounts. Among the latter, the
most important growth item is investment income. Many U. S. firms unsettled
the balance of payments when they invested capital abroad in earlier formative
years. But eventually, they made good on their investments, which was always
the intention. U. S. based multinational enterprises now enjoy good income
from abroad. In many cases, foreign income is much more favourable than
domestic income.
Two other developments also contribute to net investment income from
invisibles; high interest rates abroad, especially in the Euro-dollar market,
enable U. S. corporate treasurers to realize good earnings from short term
investments of working capital. High oil prices, which hurt our balance in the
visible, merchandise sector, are offset by high earnings of U. S. multinational
oil companies.
The U.S. economy is fundamentally beset by “fiscal drag”. When the
economy is operating in the neighborhood of full employment, present tax and
revenue statutes are capable of generating very large receipts, generally large
enough to cover all reasonable expenditures, extrapolated along historical
growth paths. There will be some fresh tax cuts, and these are, indeed, factored
into the baseline projection. But that is not enough to prevent overall expan-
sion, by large sums, of revenues for the account of central government. Al-
though we seldom realize balanced internal budgets, after the year is over, we
do project them in baseline simulations. Major disturbances that bring forth
new outlays and hold back the expansion of the personal income base cause
internal accounts to fall into deficit positions much more frequently than is
expected when a decade projection is made.
It is not solely energy considerations, such as the shift to relatively higher
energy prices, that have caused the new slower profile of economic expansion in
the United States, but energy is a key factor in these aspects of economic
change. It is not possible to appreciate fully the new dimensions of the modern
economy without devoting a great deal of attention to the role of energy.
Accordingly, the Wharton Model, among other econometric interpretations of
the United States, has incorporated a great deal of energy detail. It is evident
from the accompanying table that progress is expected in energy conservation,
a natural component of economic efficiency. Inefficiency in the use of an
expensive scarce resource such as energy should eventually result in its more426  Economic Sciences 1980
careful use. The baseline projection for the American economy shows a steady
downward trend in the energy (BTU) to GNP ratio, from 52.48 (Thou BTU/
1972$) in 1980 to 44.57 in 1990. Were it not for energy conservation, in
response to a relative price shift, the problem of bringing external trade
accounts into current balance would be much more difficult, with added
pressure on the dollar and thus on domestic inflation; therefore, energy use in
response to the laws of economics forms an important component of this entire
look into the future.
It is not only the free working of the market economy that brings about
increasing energy efficiency but also legislative mandates on the fuel efficiency
of the automobile fleet. The steady improvement of the statistics on average
miles-per-gallon is clearly evident in Table 3. By meeting these standards from
the side of the fleet supply, consumers and producers are implicitly contribut-
ing to the improvement in the energy to GNP ratio. These institutional consid-
erations are part of the exogenous input into the baseline case.
Table 3. Energy and R&ted U.S. projections to 1990
The projected decline in energy use per unit of production is not simply a
“hope” built into the solution of the Wharton Model; it is, in fact, a continu-
ation of an existing trend that has been apparent but too little appreciated since
1973. The energy-GNP ratio fell from 60.41 to 54.50 over the period 1973-79.
In searching for a set of economic policies that give rise to the balanced
solution, termed the baseline case, I have been mindful of contemporary
politics. Since the Kennedy-Johnson years, the federal administration in the
United States has been conservative, undoubtedly becoming more conservative
with the passage of time and with mounting frustration in dealing with infla-
tion. The fiscal and monetary policies of the baseline case are appropriately
constrained to be conservative also. They continue basic downward trends in
public expenditures as a percent of GNP and keep taxes high enough to
generate an eventual domestic budget balance. The growth of money supply is
prudent. In the long run there is a tendency for this model to conform to the
quantity theory of money, i.e., nominal GNP and money supply expand at the
same rate of change.
3 
  This is shown by a tendency toward steady velocity of
3See L.R. Klein, “Money in a General Equilibrium System: Empirical Aspects of the Quantity
Theory”, Economic Appliquée , XXXI (l-2, 1978), 5-14.L. R. Klein  427
circulation. This is a conservative monetary policy, to go hand-in-hand with an
assumed conservative fiscal policy.
Table 4. Estimated M4 Velocity in U.S. Baseline Projections
1980 2.28 1984 2.27 1988 2.21
1981 2.34 1985 2.22 1980 2.19
1982 2.42 1986 2.21 1990 2.17
1983 2.31 1987 2.21
BASE CASE-THE WORLD ECONOMY
4
In many respects, the economic evolution of the United States over the next
decade should indicate a general pattern for most developed industrial econo-
mies. To be sure, every country will have its own special situation, but the
principal simulation results - moderate growth, less inflation, and overall bal-
ance - should prevail for several if not all industrial market economies. Next let
us consider the world as a whole, not just the group of industrial countries
which comprise the OECD, but the centrally planned and developing countries
as well. Interest centers on their interaction and the way the world economy
evolves.
During the 1960’s economic development was rapid. Among industrialized
countries, Japan’s growth was unusually high, exceeding 10% annually. The
growth rate of all industrialized countries averaged 5.1% over the decade but
fell to only 3.2% during the greater part of the 1970’s as a result of business
cycle swings. The centrally planned economies turned in some individual good
performances, but the cultural revolution in China, internal upheavals in
Czechoslovakia, and difficulties elsewhere held their growth rate to 4.9%, just
under the OECD average. The socialist countries picked up considerably in the
1970’s but now face the same problems as the market economies in the period
ahead.
For the developing countries, the results are very mixed depending on
country classification. According to World Bank estimates, low income coun-
tries grew at rates significantly under 4% in both the 1960’s and 1970’s.
Performance was close to 6 % in the middle income grouping, and even higher
for Persian Gulf Oil exporters. These tabulations cut off notably in 1978, just
prior to the revolution in Iran, which has disrupted economic activity for some
time to come.
4 Members of the research team of Project LINK contributed markedly to the results reported in
this section. They are Victor Filatov, Shahrokh Fardoust, Yuzo Kumasaka, Michael Papaioannou,
and Baudouin Velge.428  Economic Sciences 1980
Inflation rates were modest prior to the economic dislocations of the past
decade, with single-digit rates well under 5% customary in the non-socialist
world. There were some significant exceptions in the developing world. After
the large increments in food and fuel prices during the early 1970’s, and the
absorption of the legacy of Vietnam, prices took off to new heights. The
average, 1970-78, was just below 10% for the industrialized countries, but
the situation has worsened considerably in the most recent years. This is one of
the bleakest aspects of the future outlook.
There are no satisfactory price reports from the centrally planned economies.
Very recently, they have shown a series of once-for-all price changes, but their
opening of their borders to trade on a significantly larger scale means that they
will have to absorb a large degree of imported inflation. Where appropriate
price indexes are available, they indicate price increases comparable to those in
the West.
Another dimension in the world economy is the growth and pattern of world
trade. The decade of the 1960’s was a “golden era” in trade development. Both
exports and imports grew faster than did aggregate production. As recession hit
the world economy in the 1970’s, trade growth also receded, but it remained
significantly above the growth  in production. On a world scale, the growth in
trade volume was about 50% faster than production growth.
For most of the historical period since the end of World War II, the fixed
parity system of the Bretton Woods Agreement took  care of  adjustments in
trade balances, while developing a thriving multilateral system of trade. The
build up of large surpluses by countries like Japan and Germany and the
relative weakness of the United States, United Kingdom and a few other key
countries brought the downfall of this system at the end of the 1960’s or
beginning of the 1970’s. The managed floating system was being given a chance
to operate, when the world was shocked by the oil embargo of 1973, followed by
high energy pricing by OPEC. Now there are large surpluses and deficits
among countries, subject to a great deal of turnover from year to year, as
regards who is in surplus and who is in deficit. Overshadowing the short run
adjustments among various OECD members is the very large balance of oil
exporting nations. After the first buildup of surplus balances by OPEC in
1974-75, the excess funds were recirculated throughout the world economy
through inflation, dollar devaluation, and OPEC’s high propensity to import.L. R. Klein  429
This situation has been halted, and a large surplus for oil exporting countries is
presently matched by a deficit for oil importing countries in both the developed
and developing world.
The basic assumption for world model projections into the 1980’s is that oil
production will be more moderate; price increases will be maintained above
western inflation rates; and the surplus of oil exporting countries will be used
for the development of the non-oil sectors of their economies or invested
throughout the world.
By using the initial conditions of recent world economic history, an assump-
tion about the course of oil prices, and extrapolated trends of major exogenous
variables, we can compute a baseline projection of the world economy as a
whole. The interrelated system of national and regional econometric models
that constitute project LINK is the statistical medium through which this
calculated projection is made.
5
Each component model of the LINK system is put through a trend extrapo-
lation exercise analogous to that described above for the Wharton Model of the
United States, the main difference being that the models of project LINK,
including the U.S. component, do not have the large detailed input-output and
energy sectors that are present in the version of the Wharton Model that is
being used for these longer term analyses. In the U.S. case, the projected
American economy of the LINK model is monitored by the known results of
the annual Wharton Model.
The main advantage of using the integrated LINK system for this medium
term projection is to develop the growth patterns of world trade and inflation as
part of the outcome of the calculation rather than as assumed inputs. For the
individual assessment of growth patterns in each separate country or region,
assumed values for world trade and import prices must be established in
advance.
The base case projection for the world economy bears some close resem-
blances to the results discussed already for the U.S. case, since most parts of the
world are experiencing the same kinds of economic pressures and converging
towards a similar response and outcome.
5 R. J. Ball, ed., The International Linkage of National Economic Models , J. Waelbroeck, ed., The Models
of Project LINK, and J. Sawyer, ed., Modelling the International Transmission Mechanism.  (Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Co., 1973, 1976, 1979). See also B. G. Hickman and L. R. Klein, “A
Decade of Research by Project LINK”, ITEMS (New York: Social Science Research Council), vol.
33, (December, 1979) 49-56.430 Economic Sciences 1980
On average, the industrialized countries are protected to lose one or two
percentage points of growth. During the 1960’s they expanded at more than
5%, but a longer stretch of time including the 1950’s would reduce that
estimate. In the projection, the growth rate is about 3%, the same as in the
cyclical decade of the 1970‘s. GDP growth of’ the developing countries is
reduced in this projection. as is that of the centrally planned economics. All
told, When the figures are averaged on a world-wide basis, the resulting figure
for growth is between 3.5 and 4.0% for the decade ahead. The corrosponding
figure was in excess of 5% for the 1960’s and somewhat smaller during the
1970’s.
Historically, world trade has expanded more rapidly than production, in a
ratio of about 1.5. In the projection, however, the ratio falls considerably, so
that world trade is expected to grow by little more than 10% above the growth
rate of production. This is a new situation, with new large economies entering
the world trade system on a large scale - China, the U.S.S.R., and other
socialist countries - together with an awareness of an increasing degree of
interrelatedness among nations. The United States is noticeably more con-
cerned about its international economic relations, and more involved too.
Countering these tendencies are efforts at import substitution, the introductionL. R. Klein  431
of some measures of protectionism, and some attempts by oil exporting nations
to restrain the growth of their output.
In this moderate growth, relatively slow trade era, it is expected that eventu-
ally anti-inflationary policies will take hold. These are promoted by the conser-
vative economic attitudes of policy makers now prevalent in the United States.
The overall inflation rate does not fall back to the very low ranges that
prevailed some twenty years ago. In place of the less than 5% rates what we
once enjoyed, a reduction to single digit ranges and ultimately to about 5-6%
is considered a significant achievement. In the developing world, a reasonable
target would be about 15%, on average.
The growth of the OPEC surplus, covered over in these tables as a result of
the amalgamation of all developing countries is matched, over the decade, by
the deficit of the industrial countries. There is some deficit. as well. among the
socialist countries. This projection assumes that these offsetting balances are
recycled through the world financial system. The actual process may be quite
difficult to accomplish.
Within the OECD area, there is a great deal ofshifting between surplus and
deficit areas. While the U.S. goes from deficit towards balance by 1990, Japan
and Germany initially move into deficit, as do France, Italy, and the United432  Economic Sciences 1980




Figures in parentheses are annual average trade balances.
1 13 LINK OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland. France, Federal Republic (If
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands. Sweden. United Kingdom and the United States of America.
2 Measures are for merchandise trade. F.O.B.
3 Includes only Eastern Europe CMEA and the U.S.S.R
4 Period averages are calculated as the compound annual growth rate of the last over first war projection.
Kingdom. The Japanese situation is projected to change drastically and
promptly back into surplus by mid-decade, while the German case follows a
more moderate path towards balance and reaches a small surplus by 1990.
The analysis of U.S. growth prospects is applicable by analogy to the
industrial countries as a whole. Restrictive policies to fight inflation, to pay for
expensive oil imports, protect exchange value of the currency, and to recoup
productivity losses keep the economy on a moderate path. The slowdown in the
industrial world holds back the export potential of developing countries. In
order to cope with adverse trade and payments deficits, restrictive policies are
followed. In this environment. capital inflows for development are harder to L. R. Klein  433
come by. High debt service burdens, in a number of cases. act as additional
constraints. Conservative governments in the OECD area are less disposed
than previously to grant concessionary aid.
The centrally planned economics used to consider themselves well insulated
against the economic ills of the rest of the world. This is no longer the case.
 The centrally planned economies, dissatisfied with the outcome of their own 
efforts to achieve good economic growth performance, have changed strategy
and decided to import high technology from the West. as well as necessary
grains to supplement their domestic agicultural supplies. This new approach
has opened their economies to Western inflation because imports have been 434
Table 6. (continued)
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reflecting rising world price. Gold and oil sales at correspondingly rising prices
have been used by the Soviet Union to finance part of their import needs. but
they are fully enmeshed in world inflation accounting in balancing rising export
prices.
The economies of Eastern Europe have had to cope with trade deficits and
unusual borrowing in order to pay for imports, over and above their abilities to
produce exports for the world markets. As their external accounts have got out
of line, they have had to resort to the “stop” phase of familiar “stop-go”
politics. In addition, Poland and other Eastern countries have been confronted
with domestic labor unrest in an inflationary environment.
The People’s Republic of China are resorting to similar trade politics, but
mindful of the complications that arise when socialist countries rush headlong
into an open economy format, they are taking lessons from the European
experience and modcrating their original trade and capital import plans.
Although the Chinese are approaching this phase of development quite cau-
tiously, they have enough pent-up growth potential at the present time to




















3.3 3.8 3.1 2.8 3.5
In the near term, China is growing at 7 percent or more. For the longer term,
6% seems to be attainable, although they could slip backward by another
percentage point, or so.
A special group of nations among the developing countries are the OPEC
nations or, more broadly, the oil exporting nations. They have little or no
balance of payments constraint attached to their development plans for the
medium term at least. Although they may be in a position to develop at a more
rapid rate, they are reconsidering the experience of the past five years in which
rapid exploitation of oil resources did not optimize their purchasing power for
capital and other imports and created dangerous or fatal unrest in several
countries. Many of these countries were not able to absorb imports efficiently at
the more rapid pace. Their overseas investments have been only partially
successful. As a consequence of all these problems, oil exporting nations are
opting for a more moderate rate of industrialization. Both the oil and non-oil
sectors of their economics will be expected to phase down to a slower growth
path.
No matter where we look in the assessment of the world economy, there are436  Economic Sciences 1980
fundamental reasons for expecting a slower rate of development.
Recognition of lack of abundant energy resources for the world, more partic-
ularly crude oil resources, has by itself contributed to the slowing down of the
world economy. This can be seen by looking at the results of alternative
simulations of the LINK model with different assumptions about energy prices.
A standard procedure is to compute a baseline projection, as has already been
described here, and then compare this result with an alternative projection
where specific changes in external factors have been imposed on the model. In
the case being examined here, the change imposed is an increase in the world
oil price by 10%; i. e., the exogenous path of world oil prices, set by OPEC, is
raised, year by year, to a new path that is uniformly about 10% above the
baseline path.
On occasion, we have made simulations in which the oil price was kept fixed
at some base year value or in which the real price of oil was kept fixed - by
allowing the nominal price to move by the same percentage change as an
accepted index of inflation, say a general price index in the OECD countries.
The LINK system has a basic symmetry property. Results with lower oil prices
are opposite in sign, with similar magnitude, to those with an increase in price.
The general findings can best be described by considering main elasticities of
the system. These are percentage changes in principal magnitudes associated
with a change in oil price, other external inputs remaining unchanged.
In the first place, fuel import demand falls by about 1.1% for a 10% increase
in price. The elasticity coefficient is about 0.11. This degree of sensitivity
appears in the first year of a projection and persists for a whole decade. After 10
years, if the price is higher by 10%, the trade volume is lower by about 1% .
Higher oil price discourages world economic activity and adds to world
inflation. Industrial world GDP falls by about 0.5% when oil prices are initially
10% and then about 6% higher after the first year. This works out to be an
elasticity coefficient of 0.06. For this same change in oil price, OECD inflation
measured by the GDP implicit deflator is up by about 0.2% and consumer
price rises by 0.3% to 0.4%.
When we consider that world energy prices have gone up much more than
10%, after 1973 - they quadrupled and then more than doubled again - we
can see that energy issues had much to do with the present state of stagflation.
It is not a simple matter of finding a multiple of the 10% change used in the
elasticity calculations, because those changes were introduced in an artificial
ceteris paribus situation, while many things changed in the actual world
environment after oil prices first jumped. In fact, real oil prices did not perma-
nently rise after the initial change in 1974-75; they did, however, after the
latest change in 1979.
In any event, we can plainly see that world economic activity and world
inflation are highly sensitive to world energy prices. The present slowing down
of economic growth, accompanied by higher inflation, is due, in part at least, to
higher energy prices.
The baseline projections made here for both the United States and the world
as a whole are done in a benign environment; that is to say, there are noL. R. Klein  437
untoward major disturbances contemplated for the 1980’s in this case. Since
the end of World War II and the immediate readjustment period there have
been three completed decades, each with its own disturbing factors that upset





1970’s Breakdown of Bretton Woods
Massive Harvest Failures
Oil Embargo cum OPEC Cartel Pricing
Iranian Revolution
These major events had enormous impact on economic performances all over
the world. Within each decade there were other disturbances as well, less
dramatic, yet economically significant.
In thinking about possible “futures” for the 1980’s, it may be convenient to
formulate baseline cases without contingency planning for such disturbances
because, in many respects, the kinds of formal models that we use decompose,
approximately, into a systematic (baseline) component and a disturbance
component.
This property is associated with linearity in formal model theorizing, and it
appears to be a reasonable approximation. Therefore, we proceed by first
working out the base case and then superimposing disturbances on it.
Sometime during the 1980’s there can very well be - according to many
thinkers there will be - another significant interruption of delivery of oil sup-
plies and another large harvest failure. During the 1970’s there was war in the
Middle East but not on the scale and duration of Korea or Vietnam. In a sense,
the oil embargo and OPEC pricing listed above are economic surrogates for the
Middle East War.
Will the military experience of the 1950’s and 1960’s be repeated during the
1980’s? This is certainly a contingency. There could well be large scale cold or
hot war during the coming decade. Also, the international economy has been so
upset by events in the food and fuel sectors that we tend to look to those areas
for the reappearance of disturbances. It is likely that a large scale economic
disruption will occur during the decade, but there will probably be distur-
bances in surprising new areas. Shortages of basic materials other than food
and fuel could develop. There could be a wave of debt defaults running
throughout the developing world or among relatively poor countries of the
developed world. There could be a massive dislocation in the physical ennviron-
ment, in atmospheric or water pollution, or urban congestion. It is worthwhile
exploring in some detail the economic dimensions of a few of the distur-
bances.438 Economic Sciences 1980
POSSIBLE DISTURBANCES
Cartel Pricing: For the baseline case, we have assumed that, after the immedi-
ate effects of the Iranian Revolution have been worked out, crude oil prices
would rise, on average, by about 10% annually for the whole decade. This
turns out to be about 3% above the inflation rate that is relevant to the oil
exporting countries, namely, the export price of OECD countries. In the
baseline solution, this key price grows at about 6-7% annually. Between 1980
and the attaining of the trend pattern for the rest of the decade, there is an
assumed transitional period before world inflation and the growth rate of oil
prices decline; thus, the 1981 real price increases by more than 3%. In
addition, a disturbance did appear during 1980, continuing at the end of this
year, in the form of war in the Middle East. W e are witnessing an unusual
event in which two members of an effective cartel are engaged in open warfare.
This has significantly reduced oil supplies and provides another reason for
marking up the price in the transitional period, at least.
The steady rise of 3% in the real price of oil, together with an approximate
solution path for OECD export prices at 7%, amount, in a numerical sense, to
the indexation of oil prices. It has often been mentioned that a stated objective
of OPEC is to devise an index formula for oil pricing. The simplest of such
formulas is implicit in the baseline cast. Variations on this cast have been
worked out with either higher or lower rates of increase of real oil prices.
Another route to follow is to have a multivariate indexation formula, in which
the oil price is also tied to GDP growth in the developed world, to the exchange
value of the dollar, and other relevant indicators.
Indexation formulas give smooth steady paths for the course of oil prices, but
at least one unsteady path is worth consideration as a result of a possible
disturbance. If forseeable world supplies of oil are balance against estimated
world demand, there appears to be a large scale shortfall developing by mid-
decade. This deficit could be made up either by having price rise steadily on a
faster gradient, by having a one-time large upward step of 50-100%, or by
rationing.
The fact that the OPEC Cartel has been as cohesive and long lasting as it
has, surprises many economists. At the present time it even appears to be
surviving open warfare between two members. We should be prepared, there-
fore, to experience other surprises of similar proportions. There are, of course,
some unique features about OPEC that are not easily duplicated. Cartels in
other fields of economic activity may not reach out to such important products
from an industrial viewpoint. Cartels in diamonds, mercury, chromite or other
industrial products would not have as great an impact on overall world
activity. In most food lines, grains for example, large developed countries,
which would be more disposed towards maintainance of a multilateral free trade
system, are major export suppliers and could, therefore, inhibit or prohibit
effective cartel action. Petroleum products are peculiarly concentrated, as far as
surplus capacity for export is concerned, in the hands of a fairly cohesive
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nations. If export capacity of important industrial products were concentrated
in the hands of a cohesive group of nations (religious, political, social, geogra-
phical) another effective cartel could arise. Such a possible field of action does
not presently appear to exist on the world scene.
The world has been economically disturbed by food, as well as by fuel. There
is certainly a possibility of unforeseen supply shocks in the provision of food
during the 1980’s. Harvest failures have been occurring with alarming regular-
ity as ambitious attempts are being made to upgrade diets over a large part of
the world. The year 1980 initiates the decade on an insecure footing with some
measurable disturbances. The embargo of American grain shipments to the
U.S.S.R., as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan has been controversial, not
only because of its political impact but also because of doubts about its
effectiveness. When all the arguments are sifted, it does appear that the
embargo has been effective in delaying the delivery of larger meat supplies to
the Soviet population. When it is placed in juxtaposition to the disappointing
Soviet harvest of 1980 and the food shortages in Poland, it is evident that there
are quite significant stresses on the world economy. To add to the list of food
supply setbacks, we can also cite the drought, resulting in a poor crop in feed
grains in the United States in 1980. We are starting out the decade with
upward pressure on food/agricultural prices. The downward drift in world
inflation, which is an important component of the baseline economic scenario
for the 1980’s is temporarily being thrown off course by rises in food/agricultur-
al prices and in energy prices. If more disturbances like these occur during the
course of the decade, we could have significantly worse economic performance
than in the base case.
There is an important difference between food and fuel disturbances. The
fuel disturbances of the 1970’s, stemming from the 1973 Middle East War, were
institutionalized and made permanent by the control power of OPEC. Food/
agricultural prices, however, fluctuated during the decade, since supply re-
sponses to high prices have been relatively quick in agriculture. U.S. grain
supplies, in particular, were expanded on a large scale after the massive
depletion of stocks by Soviet purchases in 1972/73. The responsiveness of U.S.
and other suppliers tends to soften the effect of agricultural disturbances when
spread over a two or three year horizon.
The next disturbance to the world economy could well be entirely unfore-
seen. In searching for new and different areas where contingent planning would
be helpful, we may cite the possibility of simultaneous debt default. Many
developing countries, some centrally planned economics, and some poorer
developed countries are seriously in debt. The degree of seriousness is indicated
by debt service ratios showing the extent to which trade gain can cover (or fail
to cover) needs for interest payment and debt amortization. There have been
several singular cases of a nation’s inability to meet current debt service
requirements, but they have always been met in recent years without the
precipitation of a crisis. Debt rescheduling has been successful for dealing with
the specific situations that have arisen - Peru, Zaire, Zambia, Poland, Turkey,
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functioning of the world financial system, a major disturbance can be averted.
Commercial banks and international institutions have become alerted to the
situation as a result of experiences in these singular cases. They have, accord-
ingly, become more prudent in loan activity. This is another reason why
moderation in the face of economic activity has become a characteristic of the
baseline projection for the decade ahead. Although there is good reason to
believe that disturbances in the form of a wave of debt defaults will not occur,
such an event is by no means impossible.
AN OPTIMISTIC CASE
While some economists may feel that the base case, itself, is optimistic - at least
complacent and trouble free - there are many  industrialists, policy makers,
financiers, and economists who strive for a better outcome. If there is a single
measure, among the many that properly describe the economy, that indicates
the unsatisfactory nature of present performance and its extrapolation along
the path of the baseline case, it is the poor performance of productivity. In Table
2, it can be seen that productivity growth during 1980, in the United States, has
been negative, while its trend projection, at rates of change that are mainly
between 1.0 and 2.0% annually, fall considerably below a previously estab-
lished long run path. It used to grow at a rate in excess of 3% in the United
States. Outside the U.S., across most international lines, it is also true that the
productivity improvement factor has fallen, perhaps not as drastically as in the
United States, but it is uniformly lower in recent years.
A central focus for policy targets that gives some promise for better economic
performance is, therefore, a policy mix that attempts to enhance productivity
growth. Since we are not sure of the causes that led to the productivity
slowdown it is especially difficult to prescribe policies for productivity improve-
ment. Of the possible sources of productivity decline, it is widely felt that
relatively weak capital formation, in the private sector, plays a major role.
Both through general capital expansion, and through modernization, it is
expected that higher rates of fixed capital formation will lead to better produc-
tivity growth. It is necessary to make firms want to invest and to use the new
capital at a high capacity rate.
Capital formation is important but not the whole story, because there is still
a long way to go towards revitalizing the economy even after some objectives on
capital formation have been reached. In a study for the New York Stock
Exchange, last year, the operators of the Wharton Model examined the result-
ing net gains for the United States as a consequence of raising the investment
share of GNP to about 12% from a stagnating level of about 10%.
6
In a rounded policy package, the raising of the investment and savings rates
by 2 percentage points are formidable steps forward, but they apparently do
not suffice to restore the rate of growth of productivity to its historical trend of
6 Building a Better Future: Economic Choices for the 1980’s.  New York Stock Exchange, New York,
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the early 1960’s. This drastic upward shift in investment is estimated to add
about 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points to the overall rate of productivity expansion.
This in turn is associated with an overall improvement of the GNP growth rate
by about 0.5 percentage points. These are promising policies but standing by
themselves, they are not enough.
It is one thing to assume in a statistical mathematical model solution that the
investment ratio is to be higher (by about 2.0 percentage points) and quite
another to design policies that will, indeed, raise the share of capital formation
in GNP by 2.0 percentage points. The policy discussion in the United States is
narrowing to the provision of tax incentives for investment through liberalized
depreciation rules and investment tax credits. There is still ample room for
improvement of the rate of return on capital through changes in the appropri-
ate tax parameters. Additional policy measures concern tax benefits for R & D
outlays, more federal spending for R & D, and more federal spending for basic
research. In addition to these standard fiscal measures on the taxing and
spending sides of the national budget, there is expectation that productivity
growth will be helped by relaxation of restrictive regulations and by the
promotion of worker training programs on-the-job. To complement policies
designed to raise the investment share of GNP, there should be corresponding
policies to raise the savings share. One possible route is to encourage private
savings for pension systems, possibly through policies to make retirement
pensions portable between jobs. Another way is to exempt some interest on
savings accounts from income taxation. The basic issue, however, is to shift the
proportions in the make-up of U.S. GNP, namely, to reduce the consumption
ratio by 2 percentage points while raising the investment ratio by an equal
amount. This is the same thing as saying that the savings ratio should be
increased by the same amount as the increase in the investment ratio. In other
words, the objective is to shift the U.S. economy from being fundamentally a
high consumption to being a high investment economy.
Other countries may view the problem differently, but there should be broad
agreement that capita1 formation has had a relatively poor recovery since the
start of the cyclical upswing after 1975. World-wide, the problem is to stimulate
investment, but, as in the United States, that will be only a step in the right
direction; it will lead to only modest improvement. Clearly, more imaginative
policy thinking will have to deal with higher productivity growth.
A feature of the baseline path is the gradual reduction of the average rate of
inflation. Many economists would argue that the central economic problem in
both the long and short run is to reduce the inflation rate and that many things
will “fall-into-place” once inflation has been controlled and gradually reduced.
Many policies can contribute to this worthy end, but a principal line would
be to tie changes in the rate of productivity growth to the inflation rate. In the
long run, if the rate of inflation is to be lowered, the growth rate of productivity
must be significantly increased on a lasting basis.
If the rate of return on capital can be raised, if R & D activity can be made
popular again, if economic regulation is liberalized, if worker productivity can
be improved through training schemes, and if the rate of inflation can be442  Economic Sciences 1980
moderately but steadily decreased, then there is a chance that we can enjoy an
investment boom in the 1980’s that compares favorably with the great expan-
sionary era of the 1950’s and early 1960’s.
The appropriate policy measures for raising capital formation and produc-
tivity growth are being looked at essentially on individual national bases. But
coordinated fiscal and monetary policies offer a new dimension in which to act.
If all major countries act synchronously to stimulate capital formation or to
ease monetary stringency, there can be added reinforcement effects. Interna-
tional amplification of national fiscal multipliers is estimated to be as large as
1.25 to 1.50. Simultaneous expansions operate through the world trading
system because as countries expand, they generally increase import demand.
This, in turn, helps partner country export activity and feeds back again on
domestic expansion in each individual country. The stronger the response,
both nationally and internationally, the less the stimulus has to be in order to
arrive at a specified objective. The more we can moderate the use of fiscal/
monetary policy, the better is the prospect for lower inflation. By keeping
inflation on a favorable path, we stand to gain much through better trade
performance.
The figures in Table 7 give a rough indication of what might be expected if
the federal government were to stimulate private fixed investment so that it
would grow by an extra 2% annually. The policies are different among coun-
tries, but they generally consist of tax changes, support from public capital
formation and support from general government spending.
The growth rate of GDP is improved over the course of this scenario by
about 0.5 percentage points at the beginning, but gradually the investment
stimulus tends to wear off by mid-decade. Similarly, there are gains in reducing
inflation, again by 1.0 or 2.0 percentage pints. A major contributing factor to
the inflation gains is the improvement in productivity (real output per worker
hour). It, too, performs better at the outset than at the end in 1985.